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Judicial Conscience and Natural Rights: A
Reply to Professor Ledewitz*
Harry V. Jaffaf
In our Spring 1987 issue, Professor Jaffa authored an essay in which he
posited that the fundamental principles of equality and other tenets of nat-
ural law expressed in the Declaration of Independence were originally
intended to be the principles of the Constitution of 1787 Professor Jaffa
asserted that while the Framers believed in the "law of nature and nature's
God," many contemporary constitutional thinkers, including fellow con-
servatives Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Attorney General Edwin
Meese, do not. Thus, Jaffa argued, those conservatives "who today most
aggressively appeal to the doctrine of original intent are among its most res-
olute antagonists." In a responsive article, Professor Bruce Ledewitz,
described what he considered to be a gap in Jaffa's essay "between the con-
sciousness of the Framers and the practice of judicial review today."
According to Professor Ledewitz, Jaffa provided no insight into how today's
judges, by relying on the principles of the "Declaration of Independence
whether they believe in self-evident truths or not," might actually resolve
disputes concerning the implications of equality, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. For Professor Ledewitz, the ultimate question is, "What sort ofjurisprudence would result from a modern commitment to the natural law
principles of the Declaration of Independence?" A question, he asserted,
Jaffa did not expressly resolve. In the following essay, Professor Jaffa
rejoins Professor Ledewitz in this timely and provocative exchange.
I am grateful to Professor Ledewitz for the kind wordswith which he both prefaces and concludes his critique. There
are, I should add, many welcome expressions of agreement in
between. I am heartened to believe that we are not going to
talk past each other, and that continued-but candid-discus-
sions of our differences will not so much intensify those differ-
ences, as expand the areas of agreement between us.
Let me begin with footnote one of Professor Ledewitz's
article. In it he says that my paper "does not deal with all of
the problems that the original intent position . . . faces. Such
questions as 'who counts as a framer,' 'what is the relevance of
the ratification process?' or even 'why should intention matter
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in the first place?' do not occupy him....
According to Professor Ledewitz, I dealt "primarily with a
much narrower question, how well do the self-professed advo-
cates of original intent understand the intellectual and political
presumptions of the generation they accept as Framers?"
2
Professor Ledewitz says that it was appropriate for me to
have limited myself to a question of manageable scale. He says
that his reply will be similarly limited, "but from a different,
one might say left-wing, perspective."3 Professor Ledewitz
says, also correctly, that he senses a sympathy on my part with
what Attorney General Meese, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Judge Robert Bork are attempting to accomplish.4 Yet he gen-
erously concedes that I have approached "the politically
charged field of constitutional interpretation with the trust-
worthy attitude of the scholar, rather than that of the
advocate." 5
It is true that I addressed myself primarily to conserva-
tives-primarily because I share with them an a priori com-
mitment to the idea of "original intent" jurisprudence. I set
out to prove-as Professor Ledewitz agrees that I have
proved-that their jurisprudence does not, in the most impor-
tant respect, correspond with the intent of those who framed
and those who ratified the Constitution. I felt these conserva-
tives would be obliged by their own premises to "alter or abol-
ish" whatever was manifestly inconsistent with the intent to
which they professed themselves to be committed.
But "a man convinced against his will is of the same opin-
ion still."6 I am well aware that however great is the obliga-
tion of men to their premises, they are seldom as attached to
those premises as they are to their conclusions, whether or not
those conclusions actually follow from the premises. My larger
purpose, however, was to illuminate the profound break with
the thought of the Founding Fathers, which is represented by
the "mainstream" of American conservatism (including most
particularly, neo-conservatism). The legal positivism of those
1. Ledewitz, Judicial Conscience and Natural Rights: A Reply to Professor Jaffa,
10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 449, 449 n.1 (1987) [hereinafter Ledewitz].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 449.
5. Id.
6. S. BUTLER, HUDIBRAS pt. ii, ch.2, line 847 (J. Wilders ed. 1967) ("He that
complies against his will is of the same opinion still.").
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such as Rehnquist has much in common with Calhoun. It hasnothing in common with the political philosophy-or jurispru-
dence-of a Jefferson or a Madison. What Ledewitz fails to
notice, however, is that the Brennanite (or left-wing) perspec-
tive that he shares is one that is basically the same as that ofthe conservatives, with whom he mistakenly thinks he differs.
For what is most important about left and right wing jurispru-dence today is not that they are of the right or of the left, but
that they are "result oriented." Their so-called principles arenot in their premises, but in their conclusions. They differ in
the particulars of their "value judgments," but not in the sub-jectivity of that which they propose as the ground of constitu-
tional law. Calling their subjective preferences "traditional
morality" on the one hand, or "human dignity" on the other,does not make their preferences any more than "value judg-ments," or less subjective. If the basis of law is believed to besubjective, however, then the basis of law is believed to be will,not reason. The goal or perfection of the law, according to thewhole tradition of western civilization, is that it should be, inAristotle's words, "reason unaffected by desire."7 This is whatlaw means according to the natural rights and natural lawteaching of the Declaration of Independence. But law thatrests upon nothing but "value judgments" is desire unaffected
by reason.
Professor Ledewitz is mistaken in supposing that I did not
deal with " 'who counts as a framer,'" or " 'what is the rele-
vance of the ratification process.' "' The political philosophy ofnatural rights and natural law, expressed in virtually all of thegreat documents of the Revolutionary and Founding period-
but quintessentially in the Declaration of Independence-was
the common ground for both the Framers and the Ratifiers. Itis in the rejection of this common ground that we see the com-mon ground of both the left and right today. Professor
Ledewitz, in his delight at my exposure of the inconsistencies
of present-day conservatism, fails to notice that the same
inconsistencies characterize his own "left-wing perspective."
Professor Ledewitz is also mistaken in supposing that I did
not address the question of "why should [original] intention
7. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Book 3, ch. 16, § 5 (E. Barker trans. 1972) ("Reason free
from all passion.").
8. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 449 n.1.
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matter in the first place."9 I pointed to the fact that Madison
and Jefferson agreed that the principles of the Declaration of
Independence are the principles of the Constitution.10 But I
also argued, notably but not exclusively in Appendix B," that
the principles of the Declaration are the true principles of the
rule of law and the ground of political justice. Original inten-
tion ought then to govern because "ought" refers to what is
right or just. But these principles, being governed in their
application by "the dictates of prudence," do not of themselves
determine the conclusions which the people of the United
States or their representatives should draw from them. They
are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for just judg-
ment. Professor Ledewitz is thus correct when he writes that I
am not "proposing to consult the Framers on the specific issues
that come before the Supreme Court today."' 2
It is the essence of prudence, to which the Founding
Fathers appealed, that it be directed to the particular circum-
stances to which it is to be applied. Our circumstances are not
identical to those of two hundred years ago. (Neither, of
course, are they altogether different.) Justice Brennan, and
his partisans, have a field day in denouncing the utility of any
appeal to the opinions of the Framers. But in this denuncia-
tion, they-like their conservative adversaries-fail to distin-
guish between principles and the prudent or wise application
of principles. This is because their conception of principles is
always, at bottom, the belief that principles are "value judg-
ments." But "value judgments" are essentially non-rational,
and the ends of prudence are, and must be, essentially rational.
Hence, properly understood, the very idea of "value judg-
ments" as the principles or ends of law excludes the idea of
prudence.
Professor Ledewitz seems to accept, for the most part, that
my interpretation of "original intent" is historically authentic.
But he cannot accept the authority of that intention because he
9. Id.
10. Jaffa, What Were the "Original Intentions" of The Framers of the
Constitution of the United States?, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 351, 355 (1987)
[hereinafter Jaffa].
11. Jaffa, supra note 10, app. B. at 415 (" 'Are These Truths Now, Or Have They
Ever Been Self-Evident?' The Declaration of Independence and the United States of
America on their 211th Anniversary.").
12. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 452.
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believes that in its decisive respect, the thought of the present
is wiser than the thought of the past. He agrees-as do I-with
Aristotle's dictum that what is intrinsically desirable is not the
old but the good.13 I believe that Professor Ledewitz is justi-
fied, as any man is justified, in arguing for the superiority of
one idea over another. He would be justified, for example, in
arguing that the central idea of the Communist Manifesto
("that all history is the history of class struggle")14 is a wiser
and better ground for political understanding than the central
idea of the Declaration of Independence ("that all men are cre-
ated equal"). Ledewitz would not be justified, however, if his
argument was based on the premise that the Communist Man-
ifesto was written later than the Declaration, or that the Mani-
festo, as a by-product of the historical school, was intrinsically
superior to the Declaration because the latter reflected the
anachronistic belief in eternal categories. In truth, nothing
should be more thoroughly discredited today, in the eyes ofintelligent human beings, than any such belief in progress.
Both National Socialism and Marxism-Leninism (Interna-
tional Socialism) justify themselves on this ground. As Ipointed out in my earlier article,15 however, Alexander Ste-phens, in his Cornerstone Speech of April 1861, justified the
Confederate States of America as a form of government supe-
rior to all others because it was based upon the newly discov-
ered scientific truth of Negro inferiority. This alleged
scientific truth (which Stephens compared, among other
things, to Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood)
had replaced the "old" doctrine of human equality in the Dec-
laration of Independence.16
I do not mean to argue for one or another version of the
reductio ad Hitlerum. Hitler, or Stalin, or Stephens must be
refuted. We are not entitled to say that they are wrong, how-
ever, because we have different "value judgments." That an
argument leads to conclusions that we do not like does not
mean that it is a bad argument. I believe, however, that the
opinions and actions of Hitler, Stalin, and Stephens can be
13. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Book 2, ch. 8, § 21 (E. Barker trans. 1972) ("All men, as arule, seek to follow, not the line of tradition, but some idea of the good...").
14. K. MARX & F. ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (Germany
1848).
15. Jaffa, supra note 10, at 393.
16. Id. at 103 (citing A. STEPHENS, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE GREAT
REBELLION 103 (E. McPherson ed. 1865)).
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proved wrong by arguments founded upon the doctrines of the
Declaration of Independence-doctrines which are consistent
with reason and experience, and which are intrinsically truth-
ful and just.
Professor Ledewitz imagines a dialogue in which I exhort
Chief Justice Rehnquist to abide by the self-evident truths of
the Declaration of Independence. But the Chief Justice would
reply to me, says Professor Ledewitz, that
there are no "self-evident truths," that there is no accessibil-
ity to a divine intention for humankind, and, thus, no
endowed rights.... [Furthermore] Chief Justice Rehnquist
would say that if people disagree about these matters, discus-
sion must be closed. At the point of disagreement, there is
nothing more than subjective preference, which may or may
not be backed by power.1
7
And again:
Professor Jaffa associates the Framers with a . . . view,
[according to which] political science and law are capable of
uncovering a "true understanding" of the individual and her
[sic] relation to society. There are principles, "truths 'appli-
cable to all men and all times,'" that Chief Justice Rehn-
quist must accept if he wishes to interpret the constitution in
accordance with original intent.
It is not clear how Professor Jaffa would like Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist to respond to his position. If the Chief Jus-
tice examines modern philosophy, history, anthropology and,
yes, even science, as well as his own being and concludes
that this claim about eternal truth is incoherent, an echo of a
less sophisticated time, he can hardly will himself to believe
otherwise. Professor Jaffa obviously agrees with the Fram-
ers that their views are self-evident. But Professor Jaffa
knows he is addressing an audience in which no one else is
persuaded.18
Professor Ledewitz next cites John Hart Ely, who asks "what
would we do with a constitutional provision protecting
ghosts?"' 9
How could we who know that there are no such things
attempt to interpret the Constitution as if we did believe in
17. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 453-54 (citation omitted).
18. Id. at 455.
19. Id. (citing J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 38-40 (1980)).
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ghosts and apply the implications of ghost-belief? Such an
undertaking would be self-defeating. Because we do not
believe in ghosts, an appropriate application of a ghost provi-
sion would be beyond us. 20
And Chief Justice Rehnquist-for whom Professor Ledewitz
now speaks unreservedly-like John Hart Ely, "does not
believe in the ghost of natural law.... 21
I believe, with Jefferson, that "Almighty God hath created
the mind free."22 Hence, I do not believe a man or woman-
not even a law professor or a Supreme Court Justice-may be
expected to believe anything of which he or she is unper-
suaded. I can, therefore, only hope to persuade them of what
reasonable men and women ought to be persuaded of. I can
only marvel, however, that someone can at one and the same
time deny that there are self-evident truths, and yet speak of
the accessibility, or inaccessibility, of such truths "for human-
kind." For assertion of the self-evidence of the proposition
"that all men are created equal" means nothing more nor less
than what Professor Ledewitz himself means when, answering
on behalf of the Chief Justice, he speaks of what is accessible
or inaccessible "for humankind." What is that "humankind?"
Is it not the human species, distinguished from the non-
human? How is it that Professor Ledewitz can speak of this
humankind without argument or evidence that there is such a
thing? To speak thus is to assume that his meaning is self-
evident.
I would remind Professor Ledewitz of the interlocutor
described in my essay who denied that there were any self-evi-
dent truths and, consistent with this denial, denied that he
knew that he was not a dog.2 3 Here we come to the real mean-
ing of the logical positivists when they speak of the ghosts of
natural law. These ghosts are not the immaterial realities of
Gothic novelists (or Gothic theologians). To paraphrase a
famous cartoon character, "We have met these ghosts and they
are us!"'24 This positivism denies the reality of the knowledge
20. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 455.
21. Id.
22. T. Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom enacted by the General
Assembly of Virginia January 16, 1786. reprinted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 946 (S.
Padover ed. 1943).
23. Jaffa, supra note 10, at 418.
24. Walt Kelly's "Pogo."
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that we ourselves exist, and have identities in an external real-
ity-a nature of which human nature is a part. In this nihilis-
tic dispensation-where the ground of thought becomes an
infinite regress-we ourselves thus become imaginary crea-
tures of our own imaginations!
Recently, the entire nation, from the President of the
United States, to every farm or factory worker, clerk, or shoe
salesman, held its breath while rescue teams worked around
the clock to save an eighteen month old girl who had fallen to
the bottom of an abandoned well. Why this tremendous con-
cern for this tiny bundle of earth, air, fire, and water? A
puppy or a kitten might also have been an object of concern,
but not to the same degree or magnitude. "One touch of
nature makes the whole world kin."2 It was the nature of the
child that brought the entire country together as if it were a
single family. After all, none of us knew her as an individual.
Some of us believed that her's was an immortal soul loved by
God. But whether or not we believed that God loved her, we
knew that we did. Why? Does Professor Ledewitz really
believe that the evidence of such experience, which is the root
in the ground of natural law, is something to be put aside as
unscientific, a kind of superstitious hang-up? We know, of
course, that human beings can be dehumanized to the point
that they can kill human children as if the children were
microbes. The minions of Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot did so in
great genocidal convulsions. But when we speak of dehumani-
zation, we imply a norm in nature by which we can recognize
and characterize what is degenerate and immoral.
By the logic of this debased philosophical positivism,
whatever is not "verifiable" by "scientific" canons is not
known at all. But we should consider that all scientific verifi-
cation presupposes pre-scientific categories. The scientist who
verifies a hypothesis by experimental means presents his evi-
dence to another scientist. In doing so he must believe in the
reality of his own existence and that of his fellow scientist.
But he makes no attempt to verify the truth of his own iden-
tity-as man and scientist-in the way he attempts to verify
the hypothesis that is the subject of his experiment. In fact,
such a demonstration of his own existence is an impossibility.26
25. W. SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA, Act III, sc. iii, line 175.
26. 1 will not now reconstruct the technicalities of this argument, but refer the
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Every attempt at demonstration presupposes the existence of
the demonstrator.
Our own existence is a self-evident truth. There can be no
evidence stronger than that which is implicit in the assumption
that enables us to consider evidence. Without the assumption
of the reality of our own existence, without the assumption of
the reality of our individual identities-which means our exist-
ence as individuals of a species-all rationality would be impos-
sible. Scientific rationality is a sub-species of human
rationality, but it has no life, or being, apart from that pre-sci-
entific rationality which is the condition of its existence.
Professor Ledewitz says that Chief Justice Rehnquist,
examining the claims of the Declaration of Independence to"eternal truth" in the light of modern philosophy and modern
social science, must conclude that such claims are "incoherent,
an echo of a less sophisticated time."2 7 But it is modern philos-
ophy and modern social science which would lead Chief Justice
Rehnquist to believe that all moral judgments are "value judg-
ments." It is modern philosophy and modern social science
that, on the Chief Justice's own premises, would require a
judge to enforce Nazi law once the judge was satisfied that the"original intention" of the legislator had been to enshrine Nazi"value judgments" into law. It is mere accident, and nothing in
the nature of law itself, as I believe the Chief Justice himself
understands the nature of law, that places his judicial skills in
the service of Jefferson's-and not of Hitler's, or Stalin's, or
Pol Pot's-"value judgments." I would remind Professor
Ledewitz that it is also modern philosophy and modern social
science which prevent an otherwise intelligent human being
from knowing that he is a human being-and not a dog. But it
is precisely because some disciples of logical positivism do not
know that they are not dogs and that other disciples of that
same positivism do not know that, for example, black men are
not monkeys, and that Jews are not termites. Professor
Ledewitz concludes that I, in indulging in exhortations of the
canons of a by-gone age, am "addressing an audience in which
no one else is persuaded."2
reader to the title essay of H. JAFFA, THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL PHILOSPHY (1975).
27. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 455.
28. Id.
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It may seem strange to Professor Ledewitz, but it is none-
theless true, that I have unfailingly persuaded student audi-
ences for all of the 43 years of my teaching career that they
really do know that they are not dogs, that black men are not
monkeys, and that Jews are not termites. And I have not only
persuaded them that such knowledge is genuine knowledge,
but that the ground of such knowledge is what Abraham Lin-
coln called, "[A]n abstract truth, applicable to all men and all
time."29 I have, moreover, found that it is relatively easy to
persuade students of this-that is, if they are young enough
and have not been duped by the superstitions of the relativism,
positivism, and nihilism, which are the reigning modes of
thought in this new dark age. Once they have been per-
suaded-as my anonymous (but genuine) interlocutor was-
that it is sophisticated to say that you do not know that you are
not a dog, then the task of persuasion is much more difficult.
Difficult-but not impossible. In the long run, we all have a
much greater interest in being thought human, than in being
thought sophisticated. I certainly do not despair of persuading
Professor Ledewitz.
Professor Ledewitz asks:
[W]hat sense does this call for a return to the "true" under-
standing of original intent make when addressed to people
who, in good faith, find original intent to be gibberish? Here
we would expect Professor Jaffa to show that the Framers'
views are true and that modern critics of natural rights are
wrong. He avoids this effort, however. Perhaps he feels
that, as a historian, it is not his place.3°
On the contrary, I have consistently argued-as I do here-
that the Framers' intent is authoritative for no other reason
than because it is true. What did Professor Ledewitz think I
meant when I showed that "the modern critics of natural
rights" could not discover any epistemological foundation for
their own humanity-for that which distinguished them "from
the beasts of the field that perish?"'" What did he think I was
doing when I argued, with Lincoln, that for the positive law to
29. Letter to Henry L. Pierce & Others (April 6, 1859), reprinted in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 374-76 (R. Basler ed. 1953) [hereinafter
COLLECTED WORKS].
30. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 456-57.
31. Jaffa, supra note 10, at 418.
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treat a black man as a chattel was against the natural law,
because a black man possessed a rational will which a chattel
cannot possess? 32 I was not making this argument as a histo-
rian. While I am a student of history, my vocation is that of a
political scientist. I turned to Lincoln's argument not as a his-
torical curiosity, but because it revealed more clearly than any
other single example the disjunction of positive law and natu-
ral law ("original intention") within the Constitution itself.
And while Lincoln's argument conceded a prudential obliga-
tion to the positive law arising from "necessity," it pointed to
the contrary obligation arising from "freedom. '33
Among the fundamental texts of my vocation is Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics, wherein he asserts that we are inquiring
not "in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become
good... ." ,3' Right action, morally and politically, is the end or
purpose of political science. Nothing I have ever written has
been unrelated to this end. The only explanation I can imag-
ine for Professor Ledewitz's misunderstanding is that looking
to the past for wisdom is alien to him. I grant that it ought to
be alien to anyone who is justifiably confident of the wisdom of
the present. However, I see little justification for such confi-
dence. The subjective confidence of the lunatic is no less than
that of the philosopher; indeed, many lunatics have imagined
that they were philosophers! And in this age in which the
most radical subjectivity is certified by those called philoso-
phers (or social scientists), the distinction between lunatics and
philosophers tends to vanish. We should never forget that
both Hitler and Stalin demanded public recognition for them-
selves as the undisputed source of philosophic wisdom in their
regimes.
What then passes for wisdom with Professor Ledewitz?
Oddly enough, while rejecting my use of it, Professor Ledewitz
himself patronizes natural law. As I have already pointed out,
this is implicit in his appeal to "humankind." However, in the
following statement he clearly establishes himself as the true
representative of "the tradition of natural law":
32. Id. at 417.
33. See W. Churchill, On the Necessity of a Scholarship of the Politics of Freedom,
reprinted in INTRODUCTION TO STATESMANSHIP: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SIR WINSTON
SPENCER CHURCHILL 1-9 (H. Jaffa ed. 1981).
34. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Book 2, ch. 2, line 27 (M. Ostwald trans.
1962).
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Self-conscious emulation is not natural law. Nor is it true to
the Framers' intent. It is an archaeological dig into the rem-
nants of natural law. It is an attempt to hold human under-
standing still at a certain point in time. Neither a judge nor
a legal thinker can be true to the tradition of natural law
unless it lives in her. Merely to appeal to equality without
commitment to the reality of equality, its self-evident qual-
ity, is to celebrate the shell without the substance.
35
One must marvel at how Professor Ledewitz can speak of the
ghost of the natural law doctrine of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence at one moment and of the self-evident reality of its
substance at the next! But there is not a word of the foregoing
with which I am not in complete agreement. In the sequel,
however, Professor Ledewitz writes:
The problem for Professor Jaffa is that he wishes to be true
to an original intent that is revolutionary in its call for natu-
ral justice, but also wants to restrict carefully the implica-
tions of original intent.
Professor Jaffa takes pains to insulate himself from
what he calls judicial activism. His methods of limitation are
first, fidelity to the text; second, opposition to judicial "evo-
lutionary conscience"; and third, the requirement of corpo-
rate judicial action. 36
According to Professor Ledewitz, these negative techniques
"interfere with an attempt to practice the constitutional tradi-
tion bequeathed to us by the Framers.
37
It is good to know that the question is not whether, but
how we should go about having a constitutional jurisprudence
of original intent! Professor Ledewitz makes the issue of capi-
tal punishment the centerpiece for his discussion of my "nega-
tive techniques." He argues that the Constitution is no more
presumptively in favor of capital punishment than it is in favor
of slavery.
According to Professor Jaffa, though the Constitution pro-
motes slavery in several respects, it is not a pro-slavery docu-
ment. Slavery is a prudent compromise, not a matter of
genuine constitutional principles. The genuine principle is
said to be human equality as demonstrated by the Declara-
tion of Independence.
35. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 458.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 459.
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But the Declaration of Independence also proclaims the
unalienable right of human persons to "life." One may say
that the calculated taking of human life is presumptively dis-
favored under the Declaration of Independence, just as slav-
ery clearly is disfavored.
The fifth amendment no more turns the Constitution
into a pro-death penalty document than the fugitive slave
provision turns the Constitution into a pro-slavery docu-
ment.... The genuine principle of the Constitution is "life,"
just as surely as it is "equality." 38
Professor Ledewitz is, however, simply wrong in his prem-
ises. The rights proclaimed in the Declaration are rights which
we are bound to respect in others only to the extent that
others respect them in us. The right to life which we are
bound to respect is, as such, a right of innocent life. The right
of a murderer-or tyrant-is not on a level with that-for
example-of an unborn child. Professor Ledewitz should
reflect on the fact that the Declaration was issued in the midst
of a war-a just war-in which the "one people" who made the
Declaration were taking the lives of some of those who would
forcibly deprive them of the enjoyment of their natural rights.
That "the great principle of self-preservation" was "the tran-
scendent law of nature and of nature's God,"3 9 as James
Madison declared in the forty-third Federalist, and that this
might justify the taking of human life, was axiomatic for the
Founding Fathers. Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Govern-
ment, the very text of which resonates in the Declaration,
defines "political power" to be "a right of making laws with
penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties.... 40
Locke says, moreover, that we ought, when our "own preserva-
tion comes not in competition... to preserve the rest of man-
kind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender,
take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation
of the life, the liberty, health, limb or goods of another."4 1
I challenge Professor Ledewitz to find a document of the
thought of those who framed, and those who ratified, the Con-
stitution, disagreeing with the foregoing definition of legiti-
mate power-a definition derived from the right to life. I
38. Id. (footnote omitted).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 287 (J. Madison) (Bicentennial ed. 1976).
40. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4 (T. Peardon ed. 1952)
[hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE].
41. Id. at 6 (emphasis supplied).
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challenge him to find anywhere a denial of the right, under
certain circumstances, of doing justice to an offender by taking
away the offender's life.42 Moreover, to cite Locke is not "an
archaeological dig."43 Ledewitz has himself cited the Declara-
tion as authority for the Constitution. And Madison and Jef-
ferson, in the same correspondence in which they agreed upon
the Declaration as the guide to the principles of the Constitu-
tion, also agreed upon Locke's Second Treatise (together with
Sidney's Discourses on Government) "for the general princi-
ples of liberty and the rights of man, in nature and society."44
Moreover, Madison and Jefferson agreed that these doctrines
were approved by the American people.45 Translated into a
more contemporary idiom, they are the doctrines still
approved-and I would say rightly approved-by the American
people. Professor Ledewitz's argument that the principles of
42. Professor Ledewitz asserts that "the eighth amendment was viewed at the
time of its introduction and criticized as an invitation to abolish capital punishment."
Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 459. This, he says "is the gist of the celebrated objection of
Representative Livemore of New Hampshire during consideration of the proposed
eighth amendment." Ledewitz then quotes Livemore: "[Ilt is sometimes necessary to
hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but
are we in the future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they
are cruel?" Id. at 459 n.36 (quoting ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (J. Gales ed. 1789)). We
observe that Ledewitz's only witness is one who is anxious not "to be prevented" from
inflicting "these punishments." Where is the witness who wants these punishments to
be prevented? As Professor Ledewitz himself notes, there are no such witnesses
against capital punishment, among the generation of the Founders, as there are against
slavery. Id. at 460. He thinks, however, that we should be bound by the principles of
the Declaration, rightly understood, even when the Founders did not understand them
rightly. Id. But it is the Founders, and not Professor Ledewitz, who understood those
principles rightly. His citation does not constitute a shred of evidence that those who
adopted the eighth amendment believed that it would authorize the Supreme Court to
abolish capital punishment. Of course, Congress-or state legislatures-might do so as
an exercise of legislative power. Certainly, changing opinions by the people as to what
constitutes "cruel and unusual punishments" might be the occasion for changes in the
law. Professor Ledewitz knows, however, that popular support for capital punishment
is today probably as strong as at any time in our history. Consider the 1972
constitutional initiative in California sanctioning the death penalty, which was passed
by a majority of 67.5% of the voters, and consider as well the rejection in 1986 by
66.16% of the voters of Chief Justice Rose Bird. (Official statements of the vote by the
Secretary of State of California.) Justice Bird's defeat has been almost uniformly
attributed to her "nullification" of the death penalty initiative, by voting to reverse
every death sentence that came before her on appeal. For Justice Brennan, or
Professor Ledewitz, to maintain that the Supreme Court, on its own authority, might
abolish capital punishment, in opposition to the express language of the Constitution-
in the fifth and fourteenth amendments-is simply unacceptable.
43. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 458.
44. Letter from Jefferson to Madison (1825), reprinted in 19 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 460-61 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903).
45. Id.
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the Declaration, which we all agree condemn slavery, condemn
capital punishment is simply without foundation. Hence, his
attempt to ground an objection to capital punishment in the"original intent" of the Constitution-seen as an expression of
the principles of the Declaration of Independence-is without
foundation.
Concerning my objections to Justice Brennan's (or anyone
else's) "evolutionary conscience"" superseding the words of
the Constitution in the interpretation of the Constitution, Pro-
fessor Ledewitz says:
Professor Jaffa accuses liberal jurisprudence of dismissing
the insights of the Framers in the name of new insights said
to be based on science.
The heart of this critique is valid. The Framers pro-
posed eternal principles based on an unchanging human
nature created by God. Liberal and radical left-wing legal
thinkers today reject all such conceptions as epistemologi-
cally naive. This is as true of main line consensus thinkers
like Owen Fiss, and Harry Wellington, as it is of the Confer-
ence on Critical Legal Studies.47
I am glad that Professor Ledewitz and I stand together here. I
take it as evidence that he recognizes, as I do, that the worst
tyrannies of human history-notably those of Hitler and of
Stalin-rested on assertions of scientific validity, as well as a
denial of the moral relevance of "an unchanging human
nature." And, as I have shown from Alexander Stephens'
"Cornerstone Speech," this was also true of the "positive good"
defense of slavery in the ante-bellum South. Proceeding from
this point, however, Professor Ledewitz appears to impute to
me the opinion that because there are "eternal principles"
there is no such thing as new knowledge! 48 It would be very
strange indeed, for someone who holds both Aristotle and Jef-
ferson in the regard that I do, to deny, as he implies, that "the
insights of science are as entitled to a hearing as any other
claim to truth."49 Of course, the assertion that something is"new knowledge" does not make it such. There is always at
least ten thousand times as much new quackery as there is
46. Jaffa, supra note 10, at 385.
47. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 461 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
48. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 463.
49. Id.
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new knowledge. Professor Ledewitz writes that "modern sci-
ence teaches us [that] developmental biology proclaims the
fetus to be our young brother or sister in the human family."'
With great respect, I submit that, while the "proclamation" is
true, it does not emanate directly from the evidence supplied
by modern science, or from developmental biology. It is true
only in the light of an assumption brought to that evidence.
That assumption-which is contradicted by the theory of
evolution, in any of its contemporary versions-is the perma-
nent moral significance of the distinction of species.
I would be the last one to exclude any evidence from any
source that might assist in legislating wisely on the extraordi-
narily difficult question of abortion. Professor Ledewitz and I
seem to largely agree that it was a judicial atrocity, unsur-
passed since Dred Scott,51 for the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade52 to set aside the legislative protection of innocent
human life provided by the laws of the states. Professor
Ledewitz's discussion of the need for prudential morality in
dealing with the question of abortion is nothing less than a
brief for denying courts jurisdiction over what is clearly a leg-
islative question. But the right of innocent human life to the
protection of law-the first of the rights proclaimed in the
Declaration"-is the ground of the legislative prudence that
we both call for.
Professor Ledewitz's call for "[n]ew learning" extends, he
says,
to new insights into older practices with which the Framers
were familiar. A good example is the view of the Framers
that private property is the "product of a man's labor." It is
no secret that high on the political/legal agenda of the Neo-
Lockeans . .. is an attack on the New Deal and the Welfare
State in the name of the Framers' commitment to individual
property rights .... But Marxism, as well as the lessons of
an interconnected industrial society, should have taught us
something about the role of property. Property is never a
matter of individual right alone. Property is a social prod-
uct. This knowledge shapes our understanding of natural
50. Id.
51. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
52. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("Among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.").
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rights.54
Let us observe, first of all, that Neo-Lockeanism is not the
same thing as the Lockeanism of the Founding Fathers. I can-
not speak for the Neo-Lockeans mentioned by Professor
Ledewitz. However, many of those going under that descrip-
tion place an overriding emphasis upon individual freedom,
defined merely as doing what one likes, without regard to
objective norms of human behavior. In this, they are very far
from recognizing the moral claims that were paramount for a
Washington, a Jefferson, or a Madison. Jefferson once wrote:
"Independence can be trusted nowhere but with the people in
mass. They are inherently independent of all but moral
law. ' 5' This qualification, however, was fundamental.
For Locke himself, the law of reason, which was the law of
nature, was a moral law. In Locke's comprehensive under-
standing of property, the claims of property and the claims of
morality coincide. Adultery, no less than murder, theft, per-
jury, and covetousness, are offenses against property. Samuel
Johnson was very much the Lockean in replying to Boswell's
query, as to why chastity in the female was so much more
important than chastity in the male: "Because, sir, all our laws
of property depend upon it."5 The humor in this remark
should not detract from its seriousness. Marx's hatred of pri-
vate property reflected a hatred of morality as an enemy of
human freedom. In this, Marx had much in common with the
Neo-Lockeans and, in general, with present-day libertarianism.
Professor Ledewitz thinks that we should have learned
from Marxism and an "interconnected industrial society" that"property is never a matter of individual right alone.""7 Prop-
erty, he says, is a social product.58 In fact, the labor theory of
value is something Marx simply took over from John Locke.
The link between economy and society (and polity) is to be
found in the division of labor, a leading argument of Plato's
Republic,59 but one Marx certainly learned from Adam Smith,
if not from Smith's predecessors. Once civil society is
formed-according to Locke, no less than Marx-property is
54. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 463-64.
55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819).
56. J. BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, L.L.D. (1952).
57. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 464.
58. Id.
59. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC Book 2, 369 B-E (P. Shorey trans. 1930) [hereinafter
PLATO, REPUBLIC].
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"never a matter of individual right alone." In joining with
others to protect his natural rights, each individual surrenders
to civil society, acting by the majority, the right to regulate
property in whatever way shall best contribute to the common
good. What that way is becomes a matter of legislative pru-
dence. Marx's "contribution" was his alleged discovery that
the common good is best served by the total abolition of pri-
vate property. If Marx had demonstrated-or if experience
had shown-that the regulation of private property for the
common good was best served by its abolition, then indeed we
would have something to learn from him.
But Professor Ledewitz should bear in mind that for Marx
the abolition of private property extends to everything-
including family. If he has any doubts on this point, let him re-
read the Communist Manifesto. Marx knew-as did Socrates
in Plato's Republic-that the indefeasible basis of private prop-
erty within civil society, no less than within the state of nature,
was the pleasure and pain felt by individual bodies and the
souls thereof. The generation of children, although a social
act, is also the ground of indefeasible individualism. Property
and family are indissolubly linked. Men and women care more
for their own children than for good children-however much
they may wish their own children to be good. The argument
for the prudence of having property remain essentially private
in civil society, according to Locke,60 is that the property will
thereby be better cared for and more industriously increased. 61
For both Locke and Aristotle, the argument for private prop-
erty is for the advantage of the common good-not solely for
the good of individuals. I know of nothing in either theory or
practice to contradict this judgment. To quote Sir Winston
Churchill, "The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal shar-
ing of blessings; the virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of
miseries." Or, as John Locke put it:
There cannot be a clearer demonstration of anything [viz., of
the connection between private property and productive
labor and the common good] than several nations of the
Americans [that is to say, the pre-colonial Red Indians] are
of this, who are rich in land and poor in all the comforts of
life, whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other
people with the materials of plenty . . . yet for want of
60. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, at ch. 5, "Of Property."
61. See also Aristotle's critique of THE REPUBLIC. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Book 2.
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improving it by labor, have not one-hundredth part of theconveniences we enjoy. And a king of a large and fruitful
territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-
laborer in England.62
Except for the status of communism's "kings, ' 63 these words
could apply today to the comparison between communist and
capitalist societies. The Lockean argument for private prop-
erty has always relied upon its comparative benefits to the
poorest members of society. When James Madison wrote in
the famous tenth Federalist that "the first object of govern-
ment" was the "protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, ' 64 he was faithfully reflecting the teaching
of John Locke. In this, however, he was arguing for a wide-
spread and diverse ownership of property (in an "extended
republic") as a necessary condition of democratic constitution-
alism. It should hardly be necessary to say at this time that
collective ownership of property means such a monopoly of
economic power as to make democratic government an impos-
sibility. I do not, therefore, think that there is any wisdom to
be gained from Karl Marx concerning the nature of property.
In what I regard as his decisive argument, Professor
Ledewitz makes a determined effort to enlist me-as I have
always wished to enlist him-in a crusade for justice, as under-
stood within the framework of the natural rights and natural
law doctrines of the American Founding. He writes:
Perhaps Justice Brennan is not committed [as Professor
Ledewitz concedes he ought to be] to original intent.
Accordingly, Justice Brennan's search for an evolving con-
sensus may in fact be subject to Professor Jaffa's criticism
that it represents arrogant subjectivity. [It is!] But for Pro-
fessor Jaffa to criticize generally the idea of individual access
to truth is an appalling irony. Professor Jaffa believes and is
totally committed to the proposition that all men are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.
Now how did this idea come to Professor Jaffa? Certainly,
as he admits, the elites of our time do not believe it. Philoso-
62. Id. at 25.
63. Communism, no less than Democracy or Monarchy, has its Kings: the upper
echelons of the Communist Party and the bureaucracy see to it that its highly
privileged members are supplied with western goods and services denied to at least
95% of their society.
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 55 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1982).
1988]
238 University of Puget Sound Law Review
phers reject it. Liberal and conservative jurisprudence reject
it. It may be that most Americans still believe in inherent
rights, but that traditional belief may be fading under the
pressure of positivism and modernity. If the day should
come that no one else takes the idea seriously that man has
inherent rights given by God, would Professor Jaffa then
abandon it? No. Because it is true. Why then should a Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court interpreting fundamental rights
be subject to a numbers test?
6 5
Professor Ledewitz may rest assured that the "appalling irony"
of which he writes is altogether imaginary. Never have I "crit-
icized . . .the idea of individual access to truth." In a famous
passage, which I often quote, George Washington in 1783
wrote: "The foundation of our empire [viz., forms of govern-
ment] was not laid in the gloomy ages of ignorance and super-
stition; but at an epoch when the rights of mankind were
better understood and more clearly defined, than at any other
period. '66
Washington did not mean that "the rights of mankind"
were then perfectly understood. He himself was then pressing
urgently toward the formation of "a more perfect union." But,
of course, Washington did imply that in the "gloomy ages of
ignorance and superstition" free government would be impossi-
ble. In such times, mankind's only options are among forms of
despotism. If then "the day should come" of which Professor
Ledewitz speaks, constitutional government would be an
impossibility. And that day may indeed not be far distant if, as
Professor Ledewitz says, "the elites of our time do not believe"
in the doctrine of the rights of man, if "[p]hilosophers reject
it," and if "[1]iberal and conservative jurisprudence reject it."
67
These new dark ages may be darker than any which have pre-
ceded them and more impervious to the light of reason. "No
light but only darkness visible," Milton's Satan said of Hell.68
It is far more difficult to attack superstitions masquerading as
science, than superstitions masquerading as faith.
When Professor Ledewitz asks why a Supreme Court Jus-
tice, interpreting fundamental rights, should be "subject to a
numbers test, '69 what he is really asking is why a Supreme
65. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 466 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
66. 10 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 265 (W. Ford ed. 1891).
67. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 466.
68. MILTON, PARADISE LOST (1667).
69. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 466.
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Court Justice should be subject to the principles of free gov-
ernment, as those principles are set forth in the Declaration of
Independence and embodied in the Constitution. Professor
Ledewitz should consider how the Constitution itself repre-
sents not "numbers," but fundamental rights. Because "all
men are created equal," the "just powers" of government are
derived "from the consent of the governed." And just as every
human being counts, every human being has a right to be
counted. Having the right to be counted means having the
right to be part of the political process-a process which is pri-
marily and essentially legislative. The principle of majority
rule-the "numbers test" which Professor Ledewitz unwit-
tingly disparages-arises from the principle of human equality.
That those who live under society's law make the laws under
which they live is an essential implication of the doctrine of
the Declaration of Independence. When judges take it into
their hands to act as legislators they are introducing an ele-
ment of despotism into government as surely as if they were
kings or dictators.
Majority rule-the use of "numbers" in the political pro-
cess-arises from the unanimous consent by which civil society
is understood to be constituted. In understanding this argu-
ment one cannot have too frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles. As the Massachusetts Bill of Rights tells us, "All
men are born free and equal."7 Because of this natural free-
dom and equality,
[t]he body politic is formed by a voluntary association of
individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people
covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole
people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the
common good.7'
Majority rule-the lex majoris partis-arises from, and is a
practical surrogate for, the unanimity by which the body politic
is first formed. Jefferson, in his inaugural address, called the
right of the majority to rule "sacred" because it is the neces-
sary means for implementing the rights with which all men
have been equally endowed by their Creator. 2 But majority
70. Massachusetts Bill of Rights art. I (1780), reprinted in H. COMMAGER, 1
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 107 (9th ed. 1973) [hereinafter COMMAGER].
71. Id.
72. Jefferson's First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), reprinted in 1
COMMAGER, supra note 70, at 187.
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rule is a qualitative, no less than a quantitative principle.
All too will bear in mind this sacred principle that though
the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to
be rightful must be reasonable; that the minority possess
their equal rights which equal law must protect, and to vio-
late would be oppression.7 3
Jefferson did not expect that the will of the majority would
always be right and reasonable. The Jefferson whose words
we have just quoted had been elected President largely
because of his (and Madison's) indictment of the Alien and
Sedition Acts as unconstitutional.7 4 And the political process,
as a means of correcting the unconstitutional enactments of
one constitutional majority, was vindicated by a new, and as
Jefferson believed, more just, constitutional majority.75 Cer-
tainly the Jefferson who had called the slaves "one half the cit-
izens" of his native state76 knew that the Constitution was very
far from the equal protection of the rights of minorities. But
the recourse of oppressed minorities was either to the political
process, or to the right of revolution. In the case of slavery,
one might say that neither recourse was genuinely available to
the slaves themselves. This, however, is not how Jefferson
looked at the matter. In the Notes on Virginia,7 he predicted
that unless the problem of slavery was dealt with on the basis
of the principles of the Declaration, there would be a civil and
servile war, in which God would take the side of the slaves.7
Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is
just; that his justice cannot sleep forever; that considering
numbers, nature and natural means only, a revolution of the
wheel of fortune, an exchange of situation is among possible
events; that it may become-probable by supernatural inter-
ference. The Almighty has no attribute which can take side
with us in such a contest.7 9
73. Id.
74. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 1 COMMAGER,
supra note 70, at 178-83. The Kentucky Resolution, drafted by Jefferson, and the
Virginia Resolution, drafted by Madison, were drafted as a protest to the Alien and
Sedition Acts.
75. 1 COMMAGER, supra note 70, at 187 (Jefferson's inaugural address).
76. T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
JEFFERSON 667 (S. Padover ed. 1943).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 677.
79. Id.
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The right of revolution, we see, is an ever present element of
political public opinion in a free society founded and main-
tained on the basis of the principles of the Declaration. That
"firm reliance upon the protection of divine Providence" with
which the Declaration concludes is something that all man-
kind, including the American slaves, were equally entitled to.
Jefferson warned that the very Providence which supported
their cause in the Revolution would be against them in any
struggle over slavery."0 "I tremble for my country when I
reflect that God is just" was repeated many times by Lincoln
in his antislavery speeches in the 1850s.8l It explains why Lin-
coln ended his Cooper Union speech with "Let us have faith
that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end,
dare to do our duty as we understand it." 2
Jefferson's prediction of a civil war was uncanny. Yet one
would also have to say that that prediction, as an element of
the policy of Abraham Lincoln, went a long way to bring about
the crisis it predicted, and to lift the cause of the Union and
emancipation to victory. Lincoln's second inaugural address 3
(perhaps the greatest political speech in the history of man-
kind with its interpretation of the Civil War as a divine punish-
ment for the sin of slavery) is also a Jeffersonian
interpretation of the right of revolution. From this interpreta-
tion we see how consciousness of the right of revolution can
become an active element in the political process by which
opinions favorable to human freedom are brought to bear upon
that very process.
The antislavery cause finally prevailed because a constitu-
tional majority elected an antislavery president. Professor
Ledewitz should reflect that in the crisis brought on by that
election, it was the proslavery faction, buoyed and driven by a
decision of the Supreme Court, 4 that revolted against the prin-
ciples of the right of revolution! Professor Ledewitz's idea that
the Justices of the Supreme Court should look directly to the
idea of natural justice to decide what is constitutional, would
pervert the very essence of the right of revolution.85 The right
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 29, at 220 (Lincoln's reply in the
Galesburg, Illinois Debate).
82. 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 29, at 550.
83. 8 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 29, at 332.
84. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
85. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 464-70.
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of revolution resides in the people as a whole. As Madison
makes plain in the forty-third Federalist, the Constitution
itself is an expression of the right of revolution. 6 To suggest
that this exertion of the authority of the people resides in their
agents, chosen to carry out certain high but limited functions,
is absurd. Above all, it is absurd because in the name of equal
natural rights it denies the right of self-government in and
through the consent of the governed. The words of Locke are
of the highest authority here:
[F]reedom of men under government is to have a standing
rule to live by, common to every one of that society and
made by the legislative power erected in it, a liberty to fol-
low my own will in all things where the rule prescribes not,
and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown,
arbitrary will of another man ... s7
The "arbitrary will of another man" is not less arbitrary for
being the will of a judge. It is no less arbitrary when intrinsi-
cally or naturally right, if it is imposed without that process-
the legislative process-whereby the consent of the governed
enters into the making of the laws that the governed are to
live under.
"Our government rests in public opinion," declared Lin-
coln, "Whoever can change public opinion can change govern-
ment practically so much. '88 The heart of the governmental
process is the process of forming opinion. If the opinion of the
public is simply and unequivocally unfavorable to the rights of
man under the laws of nature and of nature's God, there is no
possibility of free government. But the public's opinion may be
committed to the institution of such a government-as ours
was at the time of the Founding, and as it is today-without
being fully aware of what is logically and morally implied in
that commitment. But let us reflect that this commitment,
however perfect or imperfect, is always of a two-fold character.
It is on the one hand a commitment to "these ends," viz., "to
secure these rights" with which all men have been equally"endowed by their Creator."8 9 On the other hand, it is equally
86. THE FEDERALIST, No. 43, at 287, (J. Madison) (Bicentennial ed. 1976) ("the
safety and happiness of society are the objects of which all political institutions aim,
and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed").
87. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, at ch. 15.
88. 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 29, at 385.
89. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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a commitment to secure these rights by "the consent of the
governed." Logically, equal rights and consent of the governed
are reciprocals. Practically, they are in tension with each
other, and may sometimes be in flat opposition.
In the crisis over slavery, the seceding states characteristi-
cally took their stand on "the consent of the governed." They
withdrew their consent to remain in a Union in which a consti-
tutional majority held in moral abhorrence an institution-
chattel slavery-that they believed to be vital to their safety
and welfare.9" They did not see that the principle of consent,
by which they justified the action they were taking, itself had
no validity apart from the principle of equality, whose author-
ity they denied!
I am sure that Lincoln's opposition to slavery is well
known to Professor Ledewitz. Perhaps less well known is his
opposition to abolitionism. Professor Ledewitz's call for judi-
cial activism, however, directly parallels the abolitionist's call
before, and during, the Civil War for direct federal action to
abolish slavery. Lincoln held that there was no federal juris-
diction, authorized by the Constitution, for federal action
against the domestic institutions of any state. That is to say
that Lincdln did not believe that in ratifying the Constitution,
the citizens of the several states granted the federal govern-
ment authority over their domestic institutions.91 To employ
the power of the federal government to alter or abolish any of
the domestic institutions of the slave states would have been
usurpation of power never consented to-it would be govern-
ment without the consent of the governed. The abolitionists,
in their appeal to equality, would have disregarded the require-
ment of consent which followed from it. The proslavery seces-
sionists asserted their right to be governed only with their own
consent, and denied the equality which justified that right.
The error of the one side was to appeal to equality and ignore
consent. That of the other was to appeal to consent and ignore
equality.
In January 1838, Lincoln gave a speech, "On the Perpetua-
tion of Our Political Institutions," to the Young Men's Lyceum
90. See, e.g., 1 COMMAGER, supra note 70, at 371-74.
91. On the relationship of Lincoln's views to those of the abolitionists, with
accompanying documentation, see H. JAFFA, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY ch. 7 (1965). See
also H. JAFFA, THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM ch. 6 (1975).
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of Springfield, Illinois.92 Its muted theme is the danger to the
future of the republic from the presence of slavery. A less
muted theme is the danger arising from those supremely able
and ambitious human characters, who are of "the family of the
lion or the tribe of the eagle."9 3 Lincoln speaks of the dangers
of "an Alexander, a Caesar, or a Napoleon. '94 This triumvirate
consisted of the great destroyers of republics. They were men
of the greatest political genius, who used that genius to rise to
power by espousing the claims of the people. Having used that
power to destroy the enemies of the people-and their own
enemies-they then established absolute despotisms, surpass-
ing in evil anything they had overcome. Lincoln saw clearly,
with a clairvoyance given to few men, that the power which
might destroy slavery in the United States might destroy free-
dom at the same time. Lincoln's life was dedicated to placing
American slavery "in the course of ultimate extinction."9 5 But
it was dedicated to securing freedom for the slaves without
destroying the freedom of the free. Judicial activism may
appear to be a "soft" form of authority, compared to that of a
Napoleon. (Or, I might add, of a Lenin or a Hitler, who were
also essentially Caesarian demagogues.) It is well to remember
that the greatest tyrannies in the world today, and some of the
worst of all time, are called "people's republics." Napoleon also
represented his authority to be that of the rights of man. But
he saw these rights as the ground, not of government by con-
sent of the governed, but of "enlightened despotism." But
whether enlightened or not, the rule of a Napoleon-or of
unelected judges usurping legislative authority-is still
despotism.
James Madison, speaking in the fifty-first Federalist about
the means of preventing tyranny of the majority, says that
there
are but two methods of protecting against this evil: the one
by creating a will in the community independent of the
majority, that is, of society itself; the other by compre-
hending in the society of so many separate descriptions of
92. I have written at length about this speech in my book, H. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE
HOUSE DIVIDED 182-232 (1975).
93. Address by President Abraham Lincoln, Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield,
Illinois (Jan. 27, 1831), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 29, at 114.
94. Id.
95. The most famous appearance of this phrase is in the exordium of the House
Divided speech. 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 29, at 461.
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citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of
the whole very improbable .... 96
Of course, tyranny of the majority is to be prevented by the
whole system of constitutional government, in which an
independent judiciary is a vital element. But one alternative is
firmly excluded: "a will in the community independent ... of
the society itself."97 It is precisely such a will that Professor
Ledewitz advocates; an uncontrolled will to discover rights
(whether natural or otherwise) to be vindicated, and one that
imposes judicial remedies for alleged violations of those rights,
without any consent by those governed by those remedies.
Professor Ledewitz writes:
Many of our greatest cases rely on such moral insights by
the Court [viz., that there is "conduct ... condemned by any
civilized conscience"]. Brown v. Board of Education's con-
demnation of segregation laws can be defended, if one is
interested in doing so, by its stabs at history and by the
words "equal protection" in the constitutional text. But Pro-
fessor Jaffa is on sounder ground in asserting that segrega-
tion laws were "utterly inconsistent with the ends of free
government and hence of the Constitution." . . . And he is
right.98
While I am loathe to disclaim a compliment, Professor
Ledewitz utterly mistakes me, the Constitution, and the princi-
ples of the Declaration of Independence. Brown was a correct
decision, but the opinion accompanying it was so devoid of
principled constitutionalism as to lay the groundwork of future
evils as grave as any it was directed against. It is altogether a
disservice to the cause of human freedom for Professor
Ledewitz to speak patronizingly of making "stabs" at the his-
tory, or at the "words . . . in the constitutional text,"9 9 as if
such exercises were merely academic or theoretical. It was
precisely this unprincipled approach that made such a judicial
monstrosity of Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in
Brown. For consider, the heart of Warren's opinion was an
affirmative answer to the question: "Does segregation of chil-
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 339 (J. Madison or A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed.
1976).
97. Id.
98. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 467 (footnote omitted).
99. Id.
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dren in public schools solely on the basis of race ... deprive
the children of the minority group of equal educational oppor-
tunities?"'' 0 In support of his affirmative answer to this ques-
tion, Warren cited dicta by the lower court that "[s]egregation
of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimen-
tal effect upon the colored children .... [Tihe policy of sepa-
rating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the [N]egro group. A sense of inferiority affects
the motivation of a child to learn."''1 Warren concluded then
that "[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is
amply supported by modern authority."'0 2 Then follows the
famous footnote citing those ethically neutral, "value free"
psychologists and sociologists who, according to Warren, consti-
tuted "modern authority" for the moral substance of the
Constitution.0 3
I wonder if Professor Ledewitz has reflected upon the
resemblances between the foregoing opinion of Earl Warren
and Alexander Stephens' "Cornerstone Speech," in which Ste-
phens contended that the Confederate Constitution of 1861 was
superior to the United States Constitution of 1787 because it
was based upon the "modern authority" which declared that
slavery was in the best interests of the Negroes as well as of
the whites.0 4 I wonder whether Professor Ledewitz has
reflected how easily a future court might overrule Brown on
the same ground that Warren here (ostensibly) overrules
Plessy-namely, on the ground that still newer and later
experiments in psychology testify to the advantages of segrega-
tion to both races. Suppose that we are confronted with a situ-
ation in which black children are a majority, and white
children a minority. Suppose the attorneys for the white chil-
dren "prove" on the basis of a new round of "doll tests" that
integration causes "a sense of inferiority" in the white chil-
dren. Suppose circumstances arise in which the blacks them-
selves demand segregation as best fitting their sense of what
100. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
101. Id. at 494 (quoting the lower court, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (finding
VIII of the district court ruling filed with the opinion, but not reported in 98 F. Supp.
797).
102. Id. at 494.
103. Id. at 494 n.11.
104. A. Stephens, Cornerstone Speech, reprinted in POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
GREAT REBELLION 104 (E. McPherson ed. 1865).
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makes them feel dignified? This last question is not merelyhypothetical. It is not long since the demand for black dormi-
tories and black studies centers racked the universities.
I myself was on the losing side of a faculty vote to resolve
a confrontation in which it was alleged that ours had been a
white college giving a white education. This, incidentally, was
not the accusation of the blacks, but the nostra culpa of the
white faculty. It was contended by both whites and blacks that"equal opportunity" meant that blacks were entitled to an
institutional structure providing black dormitories, and a cur-riculum featuring black history, black literature, black eco-
nomics, etc., taught by black instructors. In short, it was
demanded that equal rights dictated an education equally seg-
regated-socially and intellectually-as that which guilty
whites had so long enjoyed.
The test, in the light of Brown, was not what was objec-
tively right or wrong, pursuant to the Constitution, but how
black people were made to feel. The authority of science couldsupport any conclusion since science has turned out to be the
method of discovering how people feel-although it can also be
the method of discovering how to make people feel what youwant them to feel. The Warren Court could have reached the
opposite conclusion that it reached in Brown merely by order-
ing as a remedy (instead of desegregation) a psychological con-
ditioning (or "brainwashing") program designed to overcome
feelings of inferiority. I can assure Professor Ledewitz that itwas well within the competence of the psychologists upon
whom Warren relied to have come up with such a program had
they been directed to do so: a program which would-on thepremises-have made segregated schools perfectly constitu-
tional. In fact, contrary to common opinion, Warren's opinion
for the Court did not, in the most important respect, reverse
Plessy at all. To have done so, it would have had to adopt Jus-
tice Harlan's dissenting opinion in that case, in which he heldthat the Constitution was color blind.1 °5 Warren's opinion was
based upon the subjective feelings of black people, rather than
upon their objective rights as human beings. °6
How should Brown have been decided? A brief "stab at
history" and a consideration of what, in the light of history,
105. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
106. On this subject, see Erler, Sowing the Wind: Judicial Legislation and the
Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 399 (1985).
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"equal protection" ought to be understood to mean will carry
us a long way. Consider the first sentence of the fourteenth
amendment: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside."1 °7
The thirteenth amendment10 8 had overruled those aspects of
Taney's opinion in Dred Scott that concerned slavery and prop-
erty in slaves. But it had not overruled that part of the opinion
which declared that a Negro, whether free or slave, could not
be a citizen of the United States.10 9 In completing the reversal
of Dred Scott, the fourteenth amendment must be understood
to reverse as well the reasoning upon which Taney depended.
At the center of that reasoning was his assertion that, for the
purpose of interpreting the Constitution of the United States,
the proposition "that all men are created equal" was not to be
understood to include members of the Negro race. It was his
understanding that Negroes were excluded from the rights
enunciated in the Declaration of Independence which author-
ized Taney, in his own mind, to say that according to the Con-
stitution, Negroes were "so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the
[N]egro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit."" 0 In short, the intention of the fourteenth amend-
ment was the completion of the reversal of Taney's opinion for
the Court in Dred Scott. Hence, the "equal protection" clause
of the fourteenth amendment must be read in the light of the
unequivocal constitutional inclusion of black men and women
into the proposition of universal human equality. This is just
another way of saying that the Constitution is color blind, as
Mr. Justice Harlan (but not Chief Justice Earl Warren) truly
said. This would have been the just ground for outlawing
school segregation.
Professor Ledewitz wishes my critique of our "exhausted
constitutional tradition" to be the occasion to "take the rights
of persons seriously," and to be the occasion for the "strength-
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108. Id. ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
109. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 423.
110. Id. at 407.
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ening of free government as law's obligation." '1 11 We cannot,
he says,
avoid asking about the rest of the rights of man: about 4co-
nomic rights-to shelter, food, clothing, and education; about
social rights-to wear religious clothing and to love a person
of the same sex; and about corporate rights-to prevent the
police from lying to attorneys and to bar unconstitutional
actions by our government.1 12
Let me begin here by saying that there is no difference
between us on the general question of whether or not the
courts should "bar unconstitutional actions by our govern-
ment." Even here, however, one must recognize the distinction
between those questions bearing on the rights of persons,
which are subject to litigation, and those that are not. Presi-
dent Lincoln denied-rightly, I believe-the right of Chief Jus-
tice Taney to issue a writ of habeas corpus when Lincoln had
suspended the use of that writ.113
Let us suppose that in 1941, a taxpayer filed a suit request-
ing an injunction against President Roosevelt to prevent the
transfer of 50 destroyers to the British Navy. A court would
have to be insane to take such a case, although Roosevelt him-
self knew (as did Lincoln) that what he was doing might be
considered an impeachable offense. These constitutional ques-
tions are so clearly political questions that they cannot be
resolved in the courts.
When Professor Ledewitz speaks of "economic rights" as
being among "the rest of the rights of man," he simply misun-
derstands the natural rights doctrine. There are no "economic
rights" which are "unalienable" in the sense of those men-
tioned in the Declaration of Independence. A government
devoted to securing "these rights"-those mentioned in the
Declaration of Independence-is one which will give great
security to private property. This security has always proved
to be the greatest incentive for the production, and hence of
the availability, of "shelter, food, clothing, and education."
There just is no way in which the law can declare a right to
economic goods, and thereby make these goods available.
111. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 470.
112. Id.
113. 4 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 29, at 430 (Lincoln's message to Congress in
special session July 4, 1861).
1988]
250 University of Puget Sound Law Review
Glendower. I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
Hotspur. Why, so can I, or so can any man;
But will they come when you do call for
them?114
A court of law (or the court of Caesar) decreeing that the
people shall be supplied with cabbages or doctorates is like
Owen Glendower calling spirits from the vasty deep. What
reason is there to think that they will come? The problem of
the Soviet economy to this day is that, as the typical worker
says, "we do imaginary work for imaginary wages."
When Lenin decreed his New Economic Policy in 1921, he
unleashed the productive capacities of the Russian peasants.
Not only did they enjoy an unprecedented prosperity in the
later 1920's, but the Soviet Union enjoyed an abundant food
supply.1 15  When Stalin decreed the collectivization of
agriculture, he guaranteed that for some 60 successive years
there would be poor harvests in the Soviet Union!11 6 What is
the point of guaranteeing food if there is no food (as was the
case in the Ukraine in 1931)? What is the point of
guaranteeing medical care and education, if the one is rotten,
and the other is nothing but propaganda (except in the case of
the sciences needed to maintain the military power of the
regime)? The Soviet Union is an outstanding example of what
happens when a government treats "economic rights" as if
they were "human rights." The end result is no respect for
human rights and poverty for the masses. By this I do not
mean to say that there should not be an entitlement to
economic welfare. We have many examples of such around us:
social security, unemployment insurance, student loan
programs, etc. I personally am opposed to anything that might
be called socialized medicine, but the question of how to
optimize the health care of the American people is certainly a
proper political and legislative concern. The point here,
however, is that it is a political and legislative concern. It is
not a judicial concern. Every so called "economic right"
involves a levy upon the resources of society. The exercise of
such rights requires taxes. Courts of law, no more than the
114. W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY IV, PART I, Act 3, sc. i, lines 55-57.
115. Lectures of Richard Pipes, Professor of Russian History at Harvard, at
Pomona College (1985).
116. Id.
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courts of kings, may levy taxes. That is what the American
Revolution was all about!
Professor Ledewitz asks:
Why... is Professor Jaffa so certain that governments have
been given authority to kill their prisoners through capital
punishment? While I acknowledge that opinions differ, it is
clear to me that killing a citizen in a prison cell is utterly
inconsistent with the ends of free government. 117
But Professor Ledewitz's premises are altogether mistaken.
Someone convicted of first degree murder is not a citizen.
Here is how John Locke-and all of the Founding Fathers, and
I myself-understand this question:
[F]or, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be
preserved as much as possible when all cannot be preserved,
the safety of the innocent is to be preferred; and one may
destroy a man who makes war upon him . . . for the same
reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion, because such men
are not under the ties of the common law of reason, have no
other rule but that of force and violence, and so may be
treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious crea-
tures that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into
their power."18
I cite only two examples from recent crimes in the Los Ange-
les area. In neither case was there capital punishment,
although I for one believe there should have been. In one case,
a man kidnapped, raped, and strangled a two-year old girl. In
another, two men, working together over a two-year period,
abducted, raped, and strangled at least 17 young women. In
the latter case, the young men tape recorded their victims'
death agonies to amuse themselves during the otherwise bor-
ing intervals between murders. To call such persons "citizens"
is technically inaccurate, as well as being a travesty upon the
meaning of words. Locke makes it clear that what unites us as
human beings, in respect for each other's rights, is the posses-
sion and the use of reason.119 That is ultimately why we may
lay claim to the right to be governed with our own consent.
But those who, not by mere words, but by deadly deeds, refuse
117. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 468.
118. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 40, at 16.
119. Id. at 5 ("The state of nature has a law to govern it . . . and reason which is
that law.").
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to abide by the law of reason, have thereby placed themselves
outside the bounds of humanity, and of the rights of humanity.
This, I believe, is the essence of the idea of rights and the laws
of nature.
Finally, I come to Professor Ledewitz's strange notion that
among the rights to be enunciated and enforced by the judici-
ary is the right "to love a person of the same sex."1 20 I pre-
sume he does not mean by this the love of a father for his son,
or a son for his father, or of mothers and daughters, or broth-
ers and sisters. Nor do I think he has in mind the love of
friends celebrated by Aristotle in the ninth book of the
Nicomachean Ethics. I presume that he means sexual love,
that is, sodomy and lesbianism. If so, I can assure him that
these are unnatural acts and, being unnatural, the very nega-
tion of anything that could be called a right according to
nature. The very root of the meaning of nature is generation.
What marks off one species from another is the ability of indi-
viduals of opposite sexes to generate new individuals of the
same species. Marriage is possible, therefore, only between
men and women, members of the species homo sapiens. To
conceive of marriage apart from the possibility of the genera-
tion and regeneration of human society is contra naturam.
Incest and sodomy both represent vices that strike at the root
of the family, and at the human institutions that represent the
moral, no less than the physical self-preservation of mankind.
To deny the relevance of nature as a standard in this most
fundamental of all respects is to deny its relevance in all other
respects as well. Why do we regard the slaughter of beasts for
food lawful, but not the slaughter of other human beings?
Why do we regard it moral to make of beasts beasts of burden?
Why do we not speak of enslaving horses or mules? What
ground do we have to condemn slavery, except that it violates
the order of nature by treating men as if they were beasts?
But using men as if they were beasts is no more against the
order of nature than using men as if they were women, or
women as if they were men. Nor is such use less unnatural for
being voluntary. Human beings have been and can be per-
suaded to accept slavery, whenever they can be persuaded that
natural distinctions are no longer to be thought the basis of
moral distinctions. Nor is there any difference here between
120. Ledewitz, supra note 1, at 470.
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the moral understanding of reason and of revelation. In the
first chapter of Genesis, the Bible tells us that "God created
man in his own image, in the image of God he created him;
male and female he created them.'1 21 By this it is implied, I
believe, that the creative power of God, no less than the gener-
ative power of nature, resides in the distinction between male
and female. And if nature is the ground of all our rights, as
the Declaration of Independence affirms, then maleness and
femaleness is the ground of nature.
In 1779, Jefferson drafted "A Bill For Proportioning
Crimes And Punishments.' 12 2 Like many other measures that
Jefferson advanced in this period, it was designed to promote
the cause of general reform and improvement in civil society.
In the bill, Jefferson speaks out against the promiscuous use of
capital punishment, which, he says, "should be the last melan-
choly resource against those whose existence is become incon-
sistent with the safety of their fellow citizens.... 23 More
generally, he observes that
[t]he experience of all ages and countries hath shown, that
cruel and sanguinary laws defeat their own purpose, by
engaging the benevolence of mankind to withhold prosecu-
tions, to smother testimony, or to listen to it with bias, when,
if the punishment were only proportioned to the injury, men
would feel it their inclination, as well as their duty, to see
the laws observed. 124
In this humane temper, Jefferson nonetheless proposed in his
bill that "Whosoever shall be guilty of rape, polygamy, or sod-
omy with man or woman, shall be punished, if a man, by cas-
tration, if a woman, by cutting through the cartilage of her
nose a hole of one half inch in diameter at the least.' 125
Whatever one may think of the proportionality of the pun-
ishments, I see no reason to doubt-more than Jefferson did-
the criminality of the offenses, one more than another, under
"the laws of nature and of nature's God."
121. Genesis 1:27.
122. T. Jefferson, A Bill For Proportioning Crimes And Punishments, reprinted
in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 90-102 (S. Padover ed. 1943).
123. Id. at 91.
124. Id. at 91-92.
125. Id. at 96.
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